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Abstract
Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic
states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a
steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more
organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy
issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept
of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation,
highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on
an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy
differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states,
they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national
rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in spe-
cific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation
to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign
policy domain in the near future.
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1. Introduction
Nordic government representatives frequently broad-
cast their ambition to do more together on the interna-
tional stage. Proposals range from a former Norwegian
foreign minister’s call for the Nordics to apply for a
joint seat at the G20 (Støre, 2009), and the Finnish
President’s hyperbolic declaration that “the Nordics are
a superpower” during a joint–Nordic summit with US
President Barack Obama (Niinistö, 2016). In 2017, the
Nordic Council published its first international strategy,
urging the Nordic governments “to exploit the opportu-
nities inherent in Nordic co-operation to a far greater ex-
tent” (Nordic Council, 2017). The oft-stated rationale for
increased Nordic foreign policy collaboration is that the
five Nordic states share many basic traits and foreign pol-
icy objectives, including an explicit and steadfast commit-
ment to upholding the ‘rules-based international order’
and its accompanying institutions and belief-systems.
Seeking responses to new international challenges, the
Nordic governments have been conscious that there
may be unexploited potential in pooling their resources.
The Nordic populations are also supportive: More than
90 percent deemNordic cooperation ‘important’ or ‘very
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important,’ and around two-thirds would like to see in-
creased cooperation (Andreasson & Stende, 2017). This
presents uswith a puzzle: Despite government ambitions
and widespread public support, Nordic foreign policy
cooperation in the international domain remains mod-
est. There are few indications that a formalized, discern-
able, or overarching ‘Nordic foreign policy’ is in the mak-
ing. Given the five Nordic states’ shared assessments
of the international environment, their similar values,
overlapping interests, good internal relations, and oft-
repeated aspiration to collaborate more, both interest-
and identity-driven theories of action would anticipate
intensified cooperation. In short: If the Nordic states are
so similar, and the incentives to collaborate so strong,
then why does the ‘Nordic dimension’ not feature more
prominently in the everyday foreign policies of the indi-
vidual Nordic states?
Answering this question has a bearing on our under-
standing of the push and pull factors of Nordic coopera-
tion, and thus also on whether the Nordics can be said
to represent an “integrated and independent ‘common
order”’ as laid out by the Academic Editors in the edito-
rial to this thematic issue (Stie & Trondal, 2020). We ar-
gue that foreign policy is a domain where shared societal
and political traits do notmakeNordic joint positions and
action more likely. Instead, each Nordic state seeks indi-
vidual recognition and assistance from significant others,
also when a collective Nordic approach may have given
them a stronger voice and platform.We suggest that this
is because the structural conditions of the Nordic states:
Being small-to-medium powers dependent on position-
ing themselves in relation to more influential players,
they have developed niche strategies to signal their own
distinctiveness, also vis-à-vis one another. In doing so,
they rely on policy instrumentswhich have emerged over
time, spawned by decisionsmade in thewake of the Cold
War. We draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’
(Tilly, 1979) to highlight how these bundles of policy in-
struments take on an identity-defining quality. We pro-
pose that the Nordic states are more invested in their
foreign policy differences than they tend to acknowledge
in joint statements and documents and that their at-
tachment to these differences hinders more substantial
Nordic integration in the foreign policy domain. While
often advocating the Nordic brand when they meet on
the international arena, in day-to-day foreign policy, the
Nordic states are also competing for attention, visibil-
ity, and influence. Given the relative socioeconomic and
political homogeneity of the Nordics, there is, there-
fore, a premium on positioning themselves in relation
to one another when pursuing attention and support
frommore powerful states. Seeking access to policymak-
ers in Washington, DC, Denmark has foregrounded its
‘super-Atlanticism,’ and Norway its proficiency in peace
and reconciliation, for example. In the quest for atten-
tion, there is not an insignificant element of the ‘nar-
cissism of small differences’ involved, in that each state
‘doubles down’ on its distinctiveness. It follows from this
that we do not see identity as ‘coming before’ or ex-
plaining action. Rather, identity has to be enacted and
performed (Butler, 1997; Epstein, Lindemann, & Sending,
2018), and such performances are done through avail-
able repertoires. By investing in distinct foreign policy
identities and strategies, each Nordic state has tailored
its own repertoire, which creates path dependencies and
around which its foreign policy is organized.
We begin with a brief review of theory-driven schol-
arship on Nordic foreign policy cooperation before we
present the concept of foreign policy repertoires in more
detail and explain why it provides leverage for under-
standing Nordic foreign policies and the (lack of) for-
malised, strategic coordination and collaboration. Next,
we compare and discuss the Nordic states’ individual for-
eign policy choices, especially in relation to key interna-
tional actors, noting that the Nordic component of each
state’s foreign policy remains modest. While some ar-
eas of intra-Nordic foreign policy cooperation, for exam-
ple, regional defence, have moved in the direction of
more formalised cooperation and ‘deeper’ integration,
other areas, such as theNordics’ overarching approaches
to the EU, continue to be marked by ‘differentiation.’
Finally, when it comes to relations with the US, Russia,
and China, and on joint responses to global challenges,
we find that despite bold ambitions, these remain char-
acterised by separate political goals and actions (‘disin-
tegration’). We conclude that due to the robustness of
distinct national foreign policy repertoires, overarching
Nordic foreign policy coordination is likely to remain ad
hoc and case-by-case oriented in the foreseeable future.
2. The Literature on Nordic Foreign Policy Cooperation
Scholarly work on the Nordic region and on ‘Nordicness’
ranges across multiple subdisciplines. As discussed else-
where in this special issue, we see different degrees
andmechanisms of cooperationwithin theNordic region
across a range of issue areas. Over the last few years,
there has been renewed political interest in how the
Nordics could pool their (material and social) resources
together on the international arena, both for national
and regional gain as well as for the greater good of inter-
national politics writ large. This ‘revival’ or ‘renaissance’
of the Nordic dimension is echoed in the scholarly litera-
ture and is manifest in the quantity of recent edited vol-
umes and special issues on Nordic cooperation. One bulk
of this research highlights the Nordic region as being par-
ticularly successful in managing globalization, with the
Nordics typically featuring among the top-ten in the UN’s
Human Development Index, and having a reputation and
track record as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Ingebritsen, 2002)
and international ‘do-gooders’ (Rumelili & Towns, in
press). As one observer has pinpointed, during the Cold
War, “the Nordic bastion was gradually reinterpreted to
mean not only relatively similar societal identities, but
also the idea that these identities represented progress:
‘better off,’ not just ‘different from”’ (Mouritzen, 1995,
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p. 10). Much recent scholarship also discusses (and thus
helps keep alive) this idea: That a specific ‘Nordic brand’
exists on the international arena, that the Nordics are
models or frontrunners “with best practices to share”
(Strang, 2016, p. 1), and that a new kind of ‘Nordism’ or
‘Nordicness’ may now be on the rise (Hyde-Price, 2018).
A second strand of research has focused on how
the Nordic states—individually and (potentially) as a
collective—relate to great power politics and individ-
ual great powers. Recent studies have compared Nordic
approaches to China (Forsby, 2019; Sverdrup-Thygeson,
Lindgren, & Lanteigne, 2017) and Russia (Hansen, 2018;
Kragh, 2018; Rowe, 2018; Smith, 2018), as well as
responses to changes in British foreign policy follow-
ing the Brexit referendum (Fägersten et al., 2018),
and US foreign policy under the Trump administra-
tion (Breitenbauch, 2017). Many of these studies high-
light how foreign and security policy choices in the
Nordic states are heavily conditioned by structural fac-
tors, where realpolitikal considerations kick in. The extra-
Nordic conditioning of foreign and security policy was
also present in scholarly literature in the early Cold War
years, with, for example, Arne Olav Brundtland’s work
on ‘the Nordic balance’ (1966). Brundtland argued that
the alliance choices of the Nordic states—Swedish neu-
trality, Finland’s Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance
Treaty with the Soviet Union, and Danish and Norwegian
NATO membership—balanced one another and helped
diminish great power tensions in the region as a whole.
These choices were perhaps less the result of a “de-
liberate design” than they were an “aggregated result
of incremental decisions and adjustment” (Holst, 1990,
p. 8), but they served to situate each Nordic state in
an institutional setting that balanced between compet-
ing concerns. However, the parameters for this internal
Nordic balance changed with the end of the Cold War
andwith Finland and Sweden joining NATO’s Partnership-
for-Peace programme and becoming members of the EU.
In 1992, OleWæver diagnosed that “therewill still be lots
of Nordic networks, lots of cooperation built on the close-
ness of the languages, and so on. But politically and emo-
tionally speaking, the driving idea will not be Nordism”
(Wæver, 1992, p. 100). Wæver deemed it unlikely that
‘Norden’ could come to represent an alternative organi-
zation to the European community, or that the Nordic
states in the future would form a functional subgroup
within the EU institutions and structures. Instead, he an-
ticipated “a Baltic (possibly also Arctic) rearticulation of
Norden” (Wæver, 1992, p. 96).
In the prolongation of such analyses, a number of
in-depth comparative studies have emerged over the
last three decades, mapping and comparing how the
Nordic states have related to key regional and interna-
tional organizations of which some or all are members.
The literature on Nordic approaches to European inte-
gration is particularly rich, including in the subfield of
foreign, security, and defence policy (e.g., Bailes, Herolf,
& Sundelius, 2006; Iso-Markku, Innola, & Tiilikainen,
2018; Rieker, 2006). Seeking to explain differences in
the Nordic states’ approaches to European integration
more broadly, one influential study identified “differ-
ent visions of European unity” as particularly impor-
tant (Ingebritsen, 1998, p. 184). The argument was
that the governments of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway
had adopted a ‘British-style’ intergovernmentalist vision
of Europe, whereas the governments of Finland and
Sweden had gone along with a ‘German-style’ multilat-
eralist vision. The former position combined a strong
preference for national autonomy with Atlanticist se-
curity solutions; the latter foregrounded supranational
ambitions and a stronger European security dimension
(Ingebritsen, 1998, pp. 184–185). A few years later, an
alternative account was offered by a group of scholars
associated with the ‘Copenhagen School.’ Setting out to
explain how each Nordic state had ended up with their
current approach to the EU, the scholars traced the for-
mation of national identity historically, showing how the
individual states’ self-understandings had emerged in re-
lation to specific, dominant representations of Europe
(Hansen & Wæver, 2002). Studies have also examined
the dynamics of Nordic collaborative efforts within mul-
tilateral bodies such as the UN, including variations in
their individual approaches which could be ascribed to
differences in their foreign policy identities and profiles
(Jakobsen, 2017; Laatikainen, 2003). In what follows, we
build on these insights and add to them by stressing how
foreign policy identities become attached to and per-
formed through distinct foreign policy repertoires. Thus,
starting with the imperative of securing territorial in-
tegrity given certain structural conditions, we highlight
how foreign and security policy choices become ‘sticky’
and generate path dependencies because of the reper-
toires around which identities come to be organized.
TheNordic states have often taken pride in being reliable,
responsible and recognizable as foreign policy actors.
This can help explain why—despite a range of shared po-
litical and socioeconomic characteristics and stated am-
bitions of further Nordic integration—the Nordic states
foreign policies have remained distinct.
3. Layered Foreign Policy Repertoires
Much of the scholarly work on foreign policy has sought
to explain state action either by mapping the prevail-
ing material interests at stake, identifying key norms to
which the state is committed, or considering foreign pol-
icy as a product of the international structural parame-
ters within which the state operates. In one authorita-
tive understanding, foreign policy actions “are linked to-
gether in the form of intentions, cognitive-psychological
factors, and the various structural phenomena character-
izing societies and their environments” (Carlsnaes, 2013,
p. 317). Other approaches have stressed how identity
and culture, either in the form of practice and habit
(Hopf, 2010; Pouliot, 2008) or institutionalized norms
(Checkel, 2005; Finnemore, 1996), are key to understand-
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ing how foreign policy is formulated and put into action.
Much of the foreign policy literature thus foregrounds
what we may call endogenous drivers of states’ foreign
policy choices, but notes at the same time how states op-
erate within a specific structural context and under spe-
cific power-political circumstances. Such assessments re-
cur also in the literature on the Nordic states’ foreign
and security policies. While we have no quarrel here
with analyses that foreground the primacy of national in-
terests defined in terms of state survival and economic
interests, nor analyses that highlight changes in states’
interests due to international and regional norms, we
draw attention to how an emphasis on available ma-
terial and social means—repertoires—allow us to offer
a different account of foreign policy in the Nordic re-
gion. Independently of the identity and intentions of
any given state, the (perceived) availability of policy in-
struments is a necessary ingredient of foreign policy ac-
tion. Foreign policy choices are heavily conditioned by
what, formaterial, historical, political, and social reasons,
are considered to be possible policy interests and ac-
tion paths. That is: States tend to formulate and con-
duct their foreign and security policies based on what
they see as available paths and instruments—investing
in an alliance, providing development aid, contributing
military troops, supporting multilateral institutions and
so on—and only change these gradually. In doing so,
they develop and become accustomed to, specific ways
of doing things, which become institutionalized in how
they signal to and interact with key international players.
Extending Charles Tilly’s concept of repertoires (1979),
Goddard, MacDonald, and Nexon (2019) have suggested
that statecraft and foreign policy can be fruitfully anal-
ysed as revolving around such repertoires: “States en-
joy, in theory, an infinite or at least a very broad range
of tools….They may, for example, mobilize their military
forces, conquer their neighbors, muster alliances, im-
pose sanctions, ‘name and shame,’ or petition interna-
tional bodies’’ (p. 312).
Thus understood, a repertoire is the configuration
of a set of tools or instruments that are typically
drawn upon to advance different interests in interac-
tion with others. Repertoires are not static but evolve
slowly, as new elements are added. In Tilly’s phrasing:
“Repertoires vary from place to place, time to time”
but innovation and change take place “within the lim-
its set by the repertoire already established for their
place…[and]…time” (Tilly, 2006, p. 35, emphasis added).
We contend that repertoires are also relatively resistant
to systemic changes. There are two key reasons for this.
The first is that path-dependency is created when actors
invest in particular ways of doing things, becoming good
at and developing networks around certain issue-areas
(e.g., ‘digitalization,’ ‘women, peace and security’ or
‘peace and reconciliation’) or certain instruments (e.g.,
sanctions or multilateral investments; Peters, Pierre, &
King, 2005). The second reason is that states attach their
identity to and perform their distinctive profile through
these repertoires. Repertoires are therefore central for
states’ ability to signal to other states who they are,
what they are capable of doing, and what others can ex-
pect from them (Tilly, 2006, p. 41; see also Neumann &
Sending, 2020; Rowe, 2020, p. 4). By drawing attention
to the repertoires that each state has developed over
time, we highlight how what are considered as possible
tools or action paths, come to structure the type of for-
eign policy that can be conducted. This is so because for-
eign policy identity or profile is not just ‘there,’ available
for everyone to see or adopt. Rather, identity comes into
being through actions and performances, which in turn
necessarily rely on what Vincent Pouliot has referred
to as ‘available ways of doing things’ (Pouliot, 2020).
This stress on performance is important, as it implies, in
Duvall and Chowdhury’s (2011, p. 338) apt formulation,
that “there is no doer before the deed.” In other words:
The kind of foreign policy actors that Denmark, Iceland,
Finland, Norway or Sweden are, in the eyes of other in-
ternational actors, emerges through that state’s foreign
policy actions, actions which are in turn conditioned by
historically established repertoires. By dint of its histori-
cal decisions and investment of resources, Finland has a
different foreign policy repertoire than Norway; this fact
structures the Finnish and Norwegian governments’ re-
spective room for manoeuvre on the international arena
and in relation to significant other actors.
Understanding foreign policy through a focus on
repertoires becomes evenmore important whenwe con-
sider the structural conditions under which the Nordics
find themselves, having to manage conflicting demands
in their environment. The literature on hegemony sug-
gests that repertoires rest to a considerable degree on
the provision of public or club goods, such as security
guarantees, an open trade system, and so on (Cooley &
Nexon, 2020). It can be seen as a contract, where the
hegemon provides security guarantees in exchange for
political loyalty from the subordinate state (Lake, 2009).
In this perspective, both Denmark and Norway have, bi-
laterally and through their NATO membership, entered
into a contract with the US for security guarantees, of-
fering political loyalty and support in exchange. But a
quick glance at the foreign policies of Denmark and
Norway also reveals how much both states’ foreign poli-
cies are organized around seeking attention from and ac-
cess to US policymakers. Both states want to be recog-
nized as reliable, competent, and useful partners, and
they, therefore, strive to contribute to the production of
the club and public goods that the US—qua hegemon—
is assumed to produce for them. Denmark and Norway’s
contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Libya are
cases in point. At the same time, these two states’ foreign
policy repertoires are not, as realist accountsmight claim,
solely organized around the pursuit of military support,
or security: understood as territorial survival. Ontological
security—to preserve and be recognised as a particular
kind of self—will, in many cases be as or even more im-
portant (Mitzen, 2006), particularly for smaller states like
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the Nordics. The quest for political and diplomatic clout
and recognition from key others will be important objec-
tives in and of themselves (Jakobsen, Ringsmose, & Saxi,
2018; Lindemann & Ringmar, 2015). A focus on reper-
toires adds complexity to accounts focusing on identity
as a foreign policy driver, because it takes into account
how states also use their identities strategically, to ac-
quire access, influence, and support. Being a frontrunner
in development assistance or peace and reconciliation,
for example, can be a comparative advantage, and some-
thing a smaller state can use as a bargaining chip in ef-
forts to gain attention from a significant other state. This
explains why small states in some settings will empha-
size rather than tone down their uniqueness in a group
of likeminded peers, engaging in a “friendly kind of sta-
tus competition” (Røren, 2019). In the Nordic context,
Denmark stands out as themost ‘Atlanticist,’ Sweden the
most ‘feminist,’ and so on.
3.1. The Individual Foreign Policy Repertoires of the
Nordic States
There are many similarities in the five Nordic states’ for-
eign policies, including in their geopolitical framework
conditions, their resources, their political systems, and
in how they see themselves and their room for maneu-
ver in the international system. All the Nordic states have
been staunch and vocal supporters of democratic values,
the rule of law, and good governance, as well as of mul-
tilateral frameworks that have guaranteed the uphold-
ing of these since the late 1940s: the UN, NATO and the
EEC/EU. At the same time, important differences in the
individual states’ foreign policy identities and repertoires
remain—differences which can in large part be traced
back to paths taken and decisions made during and in
the wake of the Cold War.
In the early Cold War years, Denmark, Iceland and
Norway chose to seek security guarantees from the
Atlantic powers, bilaterally and through NATO. From
1951, Iceland also had US military forces stationed at
the Keflavík military base. By contrast, Sweden opted for
a policy of neutrality in wartime and freedom from al-
liances in peacetime, while Finland, also adopting a pol-
icy of neutrality, signed an agreement of friendship, co-
operation, and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.
In one influential reading, these differences in chosen
paths constituted a ‘Nordic balance,’ where the Nordic
states’ individual security choices complemented and
balanced one another in relation to the great powers
and helped secure stability in the region as a whole
(Brundtland, 1966). While the collapse of the Soviet
Union and subsequent end of the Cold War made these
intra-Nordic differences less profound and critical, past
choices and experiences continue to shape what these
states consider to be feasible foreign policy choices and
instruments. All the Nordic states have adapted their
foreign policies since the Cold War came to an end, as
evident for example in their approaches to NATO and
the EU. However, they havemade these adjustments in a
way that is consistent with their historically established
foreign policy repertoires, which were defined by their
respective positioning vis-à-vis the two key security ac-
tors during that period: the US and Russia. 70 years af-
ter NATO’s foundation, and despite the US having be-
come a more unpredictable foreign policy actor under
the Trump Administration, Denmark and Norway con-
tinue to put Atlanticism first. Both governments insist
that bilateral security ties with the hegemon remain as
strong as ever. In Iceland’s case, the US withdrawal from
theKeflavík base in 2006 and its lack of support to Iceland
during the financial crisis in 2008, triggered a domestic
debate about whether Iceland needed to seek military
and economic shelter elsewhere (Thorhallsson, 2018).
Still, Atlanticism has remained a key pillar in Icelandic
security and defence policy, and the Icelandic EU mem-
bership application—submitted in 2009—has since been
put on ice. In view of this, Finland and Sweden’s re-
positioning towards closer cooperation with the US, in
recent years, including through bi- and trilateral state-
ments of intent, could at one level be seen to repre-
sent a convergence around a Nordic ‘norm’ to cooper-
ate closely with the Atlantic hegemon. The joint state-
ment by the Nordic defenceministers in 2015, describing
Russia’s recent actions as “the greatest challenge to the
European security situation,” could be interpreted in the
same fashion (Søreide, Wammen, Haglund, Sveinsson, &
Hultqvist, 2015). Both Finland and Sweden have also en-
tered into partnership agreements with NATO, allowing
them to take part in working procedures and exercises
(e.g., Trident Juncture) alongside member states. Still,
while Sweden is taking a step towards theUS andNATO, it
is holding on to its traditional repertoire of freedom from
alliances (Fägersten & Jerdén, 2018). Similarly, despite
seeking Atlanticist defence guarantees, Finland has been
careful to signal that good neighbourly relations and dia-
loguewith Russia remain a priority (Creutz, 2018). Hence,
while the intra-Nordic differences in approach to and re-
lations with the US hegemon may seem smaller and less
divisive today than they were during the Cold War, they
remain significant enough to preclude a unified Nordic
approach. Approaching the US under a Nordic umbrella
could blur important differences between the states, and
hence make it more difficult for each state to communi-
cate its special position and needs to Washington, DC.
A similar picture emerges in relation to the EU. In
the early Cold War years, the Nordic states reached
similar conclusions and remained outside of the early
initiatives for Western European economic integration.
Together with Britain, the three Scandinavian states
instead formed the European Free Trade Association,
hence choosing to be part of ‘the-outer-seven’ rather
than the ‘inner-six’ constellation in Europe. However,
when Britain u-turned and applied for membership af-
ter all, both Denmark and Norway followed. In 1973,
Denmark broke ranks with the rest of the Nordics and
entered the EEC while Norway remained outside after
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a majority of voters rejected membership in a nation-
wide referendum. In 1995, a Norden-in-Europe dimen-
sion seemed more possible when Sweden and Finland
also joined the EU. However, while both Norway and
Iceland are members of the European Economic Area
and have also ‘opted in’ to a wide range of EU policies
beyond that agreement, they remain outside of themain
EU decision-making bodies. Accordingly, they have to
exercise diplomacy ‘through the back door’ to ensure
influence and access (Haugevik, 2017). For the Nordic
EU insiders (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) the EU has
become a key arena for inter-state diplomacy and for-
eign policy formulation. At the same time, and while
these three often share basic views, they have main-
tained distinct foreign policy profiles. Despite being the
first Nordic EEC member state, Denmark has upheld a
reputation as themore skeptical ‘footdragger’ in the con-
text of European integration—as the Danish opt-outs un-
der the justice, security, and defence policies suggest
(Adler-Nissen, 2014; Andersen, 2018). At the other end
of the scale, Finland is the only Nordic state to have
adopted the Euro, making it the most ‘Europeanised’ of
theNordicmember states in terms of vertical integration.
Thus, under the broader EU- European Economic Area
umbrella, we continue to see distinct foreign policies
of each Nordic state (Leruth, Gänzle, & Trondal, 2018).
Nordic cooperation within the EU has so far taken place
either on an informal, ad hoc basis or in a broader format
which also includes the three Baltic states (Iso-Markku
et al., 2018, pp. 9–16).
In recent years, China has also risen up the foreign
policy agenda of all five Nordic states. Having seen trade
relations with China increase, all have sought to balance
initiatives to boost economic ties, with the voicing of
concern regarding human rights. The last decade, both
Norway and Sweden have experienced profound difficul-
ties in their bilateral relationship with China following
what the Chinese government has deemed violations of
the principle of non-interference: The Norwegian Nobel
Peace Prize to the dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010 and the
Swedish PEN’s award to dissident Gui Minhai in 2019.
While a joint Nordic strategy towards China on the is-
sue of human rights may seem like a logical ambition,
the Nordic states have so far assumed tailored, national
approaches. As Andreas Bøje Forsby (2019, p. 13) has
summarized, Sweden “tends to be the most active” in
publicly criticizing Chinese human rights violations, while
Denmark and Norway have been “somewhat more dis-
creet in their moral activism.” Finland and Iceland have
both adopted “a relatively pragmatic position vis-à-vis
Beijing” (Forsby, 2019, p. 13). For all the Nordics, Forsby
observes, the general tendency has been to handle hu-
man rights issues in “closed-doors bilateral meetings”
or, in Denmark, Finland and Sweden’s case, “‘outsource’
them to Brussels as part of the recurring EU-wide human
rights dialogue” (Forsby, 2019, pp. 13–14). Therefore,
in relations with China, the Nordic states overall re-
main an ‘uncoordinated quintet’ (Sverdrup-Thygeson &
Hellström, 2016), thus serving as an illustration of how
perceived needs to tailor and fine-tune approaches to na-
tional needs, may effectively hinder a collective Nordic
approach. While there is a clear ‘pull’ to establish a more
clearly articulated ‘Nordic’ component of foreign pol-
icy, the structural conditions of each state are such that
signalling niche competencies and distinct ‘assets’ mat-
ter more.
3.2. A Joint Nordic Foreign Policy Repertoire?
The basis for intra-Nordic cooperation is the Helsinki
Treaty (1962), most recently revised in 1995. The inter-
parliamentary Nordic Council was founded in 1952 and
the intergovernmental Nordic Council of Ministers in
1971. Intra-Nordic coordination and collaboration from
these agreements cover a broad range of issues, includ-
ing infrastructure, telecoms, the environment, tourism
and popular culture, and the free movement of labour.
To varying degrees, these initiatives help underpin the
idea that a common ‘Nordic order’ exists. ‘Norden in
Norden’ has been the story about a (Scandinavian) lan-
guage community, where communication is marked by
informality and high levels of inter-state trust. This image
of a closely-knit Nordic order and community has formed
the basis for discussions both among theBaltic states and
in the Balkans, where the Nordic region could serve as a
reference point for successful integration.
In prolongation, the Nordic governments have at
times sought to capitalize on the success of the ‘Nordic
model’ as a response to globalization, as illustrated for
example by the Nordic prime ministers’ joint initiative
‘Nordic Solutions to Global Challenges’ in 2015. The
Nordic Council of Ministers has also hinted at a bolder
foreign policy ambition, despite this formally belonging
outside of these institutional structures. In 2017, the
Nordic Council presented its first international strategy
(Nordic Council, 2017), which has been used to lever-
age face time with key allies. The Nordic heads of gov-
ernment’s much-publicized joint meeting with Obama in
Washington, DC in 2016, was followed up by a Nordic
summit with India’s prime minister in 2018, and a joint
meeting with Angela Merkel in Reykjavik in 2019 to
discuss climate change. China has also signalled inter-
est to engage in the ‘5 + 1’ format (Iso-Markku et al.,
2018, p. 14).
Seeking to operationalize the sometimes-lofty po-
litical ambitions for more comprehensive and commit-
ting Nordic foreign policy cooperation, in 2008, the
five Nordic foreign ministers invited an expert group
led by former Norwegian foreign minister Thorvald
Stoltenberg, to “draw up proposals for closer foreign and
security policy cooperation between the Nordic coun-
tries” (Stoltenberg, 2009). The final report presented
13 proposals for formalizing and strengthening Nordic
cooperation in the foreign policy and security domain.
The proposals varied in ambition, scope, and feasibil-
ity. Thematically, they covered peacebuilding, air surveil-
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lance, maritime monitoring and Arctic issues, societal se-
curity, cooperation between the foreign services, mili-
tary cooperation, and a Nordic declaration of solidarity
(Stoltenberg, 2009). With its concrete, and in some cases
bold proposals, the report has become a standard refer-
ence in policy and scholarly debate into the possibilities
for, and constraints of, Nordic foreign and security col-
laboration. It also stimulated debate about the Nordic
governments’ willingness and ability to translate ambi-
tions into concrete initiatives and structures. One decade
later, a review report commissioned by the Icelandic
presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers, found that
three of the proposals from the Stoltenberg report had
been implemented more or less in full: Nordic cooper-
ation on surveillance of the Icelandic airspace, a Nordic
resource network to protect against cyber-attack, and co-
operation between theNordic foreign services (Haugevik
& Sverdrup, 2019). All these could be seen as proposals
that fitted well within and supplemented each state’s ex-
isting foreign and security policy repertoires, and as in-
stances where collaboration did not duplicate efforts al-
ready taking place within NATO or the EU. Further, the re-
view found that some progress had been made on seven
proposals, if not necessarily in the exactway and formen-
visioned by the Stoltenberg report. This included the es-
tablishment of a Nordic maritimemonitoring system and
a maritime response force; the strengthening of Nordic
cooperation on Arctic issues; the establishment of a dis-
aster response unit; the increase in intra-Nordic military
cooperation on transport, medical services, education,
materiel, and exercise ranges; the establishment of an
amphibious unit; and the issuing of a Nordic declaration
of solidarity. Finally, on three of the proposals—the issu-
ing of a Nordic stabilization task force, a satellite system
for surveillance and communications, and a war crimes
investigation unit—the review found that little or noth-
ing had happened (Haugevik & Sverdrup, 2019). What
these three proposals had in commonwas that they all in-
volved the establishment of specific new structures and
units and a high degree of institutionalisation.
These findings suggest that while it is important for
the Nordic states to signal a willingness to cooperate,
such ambitions are only translated into action to the
degree that they fit with the state-specific repertoires
around which foreign policy decisions are made. In gen-
eral, Nordic cooperation within the Nordic region, or ad-
ministratively in embassies around the world, may be
easier to realize because they add to national repertoires,
and do not duplicate functions already covered by ex-
isting structures or institutions such as NATO or the EU.
However, also in these respects, there is a danger of un-
derestimating intra-Nordic differences, for example, in
bureaucratic set ups (see, e.g., Bredesen & Friis, 2019).
In 2020, the Bjarnason report—commissioned by the
Nordic foreignministers as a follow-up to the Stoltenberg
report—recommended that the Nordic states should
“build on and expand the Nordic brand,” assume leader-
ship on the international stage, and formulate Nordic re-
sponses to three key policy challenges: climate change;
hybrid and cyber threats; and threats to multilateral-
ism and the rules-based international order (Bjarnason,
2020, pp. 2–3). The report proposed developing com-
mon Nordic policies, approaches, or understandings in
several areas and, where possible, the pooling of re-
sources and the establishment of common structures.
Here, it may be worthwhile noting that the Nordics have
often had the ambition to join forces and speak with a
common voice, as they share overarching priorities con-
cerning, for example, multilateralism and development
work. However, scholars have noted that Nordic coop-
eration, for example at the UN, has been less extensive
than one might expect and has also become less appar-
ent since the EU also started to develop similar ambi-
tions for greater coordination (Laatikainen, 2003). One
reason may be that when the Nordic states work to-
gether, they run the risk of appearing as moralistic, ‘self-
righteous,’ or ‘smug,’ as a Swedish foreign minister once
observed (Wallström, 2018). Another is that the Nordic
states themselves have called for the breaking up of per-
manent voting coalitions in the UN. Hence it might ap-
pear contradictory, even hypocritical if Nordic ‘ganging-
up’ became too apparent. Along with the stickiness of es-
tablished national repertoires and the inclination to pre-
serve individual niches, these factors could be said to hin-
der full activation of a Nordic foreign policy repertoire.
4. Conclusion
In the early Cold War years, the Nordic states’ geopoliti-
cal location, war experiences, geographical proximity to
and relationship with dominant powers, as well as their
self-understanding as foreign policy actors, led them to
pursue different paths in the formulation of foreign and
security policies. The differences in choice gave rise to
the idea of ‘a Nordic balance’—the idea being that the
Nordic states’ foreign and security policy choices com-
plemented one another and helped reduce great power
tensions in the region as a whole (Brundtland, 1966).
Following Tilly (1979), we have argued here that struc-
tural constraints, along with self-perceptions, resources,
and established routines, are constitutive of the individ-
ual Nordic states’ foreign policy repertoire: What these
states can do, what they know how to do, and what
others expect them to do in the international political
arena (see also Tarrow, 1994). The concept of repertoires
thus draws attention to the path-dependency of foreign
policy in terms of expertise within a state’s diplomatic
corps, the networks it can mobilize internationally, its
international reputation, and the organizational machin-
ery (budgets, offices, practices) used to implement pol-
icy. We have argued that these individual repertoires are
key to understanding the continued lack of a ‘common
order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy do-
main. Despite oft-stated political ambitions to move in
such a direction, and despite the narratives about Nordic
‘likemindedness’ and similarities in the organization and
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implementation of foreign policy, collaboration in this
domain continues to be marked by talk rather than coor-
dinated action, and case-by-case initiatives rather than
formalized procedures. We noted at the outset that in
foreign policy, shared socioeconomic and political traits
do not increase the likelihood of cooperation. This can be
put even more starkly: Such similarities can at times re-
duce the likelihoodof cooperation and thatwe can talk of
a ‘narcissism of small differences.’ Finland and Sweden’s
neutrality and freedom from alliances during the Cold
War spawned foreign policy repertoires and identities
that still work against full convergence with NATO mem-
bers Denmark and Norway, despite changing power po-
litical dynamics. Similarly, theNordic states’ relationships
with the EU ismarked by distinguishedmodels of integra-
tion as well as specific relational identities, which struc-
ture not only each state’s relationship to the EU but also
the Nordic states’ relations with one another. A more
organized, common Nordic approach within the EU is,
therefore, less available as a course of action.
We see the Nordic states’ foreign policies as being
formulated and conducted in a structured environment
where they depend on support and attention frommore
powerful states to advance their interests: Given their rel-
ative smallness in terms of economic size and political
posture, an overarching foreign policy strategy has been
to establish and maintain good relations with more pow-
erful international players. This attention-seeking game
is one where smaller states compete for access to and
attention from significant other states to advance their
national interests. Each Nordic state has over time de-
veloped a distinct repertoire that involves niche com-
petencies and resources that are being used to signal
distinctiveness vis-à-vis others. Seen from Copenhagen,
Helsinki, Oslo, Reykjavik, or Stockholm, the safest bet in
gaining access and attention in Washington, DC will of-
ten not be to foreground similarities with Nordic neigh-
bours. It remains an open question whether such a ‘nar-
cissism of small differences’ will continue to character-
ize future relations with an increasingly powerful China.
The Nordics have, broadly speaking, similar interests in
their relations with the emerging great power, organized
around trade and investments. However, and as shown
above, approaches to China have so far differed, not least
with respect to the balancing between trade interests
and the voicing of concern over human rights. Against
this backdrop, we conclude that while Nordic govern-
ments and populations are generally positive to a fur-
ther strengthening of Nordic foreign policy cooperation,
there tends to be a decoupling between publicly stated
ambitions, and action and resource allocation towards
joint foreign policy initiatives beyond the Nordic region.
As long as each Nordic state continues to treat Nordic co-
operation as part of their individual foreign policy reper-
toire, rather than committing to developing a collective
Nordic foreign policy repertoire, the overarching Nordic
foreign policy coordination is likely to remain ad hoc and
on a case-by-case basis.
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